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INTRODUCTION

Lawmakers in the world's two largest economies, the United States
and Japan, have enacted legislation to require firms to at least consider
altering their governance structure. In the United States, the 2002
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) rules have led to revised governance structures at the 30 Dow
Jones (DJ) companies. The governance changes affect the composition,
size and functions of the board of directors and its relations with the
chief executive officer (CEO). Research findings reveal some distinct
governance elements that other firms may want to consider using. A
2003 change in the Japanese Commercial Code provided firms with
three governance options, including a "Company with Committees"
system similar to that found in U.S. firms. To date, only a small
percentage of Japanese firms are selecting that system. While the
hesitancy to change is grounded in cultural components of the existing
corporate governance structure, there is clear evidence that the strength
of those factors is diminishing.
In the DJ 30 firms, the size of boards has decreased and
independence of board members appears to be increasing. We note,
however, that having a majority of directors who are from outside the
firm, as is true of all firms surveyed, does not always result in an
independent board. Outside directors may lack independence, and it is
independence among directors that is vital to effective corporate
governance. Usually the CEO is the only insider on the board and the
CEO is usually, but not always, the chairman of the board. The
relationships between boards and external auditors vary little due to the
SOX requirements.
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In Japan, there has been a reduction in the size of boards and a
small increase in the number of outside board members. As in the
United States, the CEO is often dominant in selecting board members.
Japanese firms now have three governance options available and each,
particularly the new "Company with Committees" system, is examined
here along with the reasons why firms either change or decide not to do
so. We endorse allowing firms to adopt different governance systems to
accommodate special needs as well as country, corporate and cultural
concerns. Each country's system has improved the outlook for more
effective corporate governance. The U.S. legal changes are already quite
extensive, but specific additions to the Japanese Code are needed to
obtain clearer oversight by corporate boards. Greater use of independent
directors and the separation of the CEO and Chairman roles by firms in
both countries would enhance corporate governance.
A. Impetus for Governance Reform in the U.S. and Japan

In the United States, corporate governance reform emerged after
widespread financial scandals came to light. According to reports
compiled by Bloomberg.com and yahoofinance.com, as of August 2002
the scandals at Enron, Global Crossing, Adelphia, Tyco, Xerox, World
Com, Arthur Andersen, ImClone and a few other firms led to billions of
dollars in lost stock value and at least one hundred thousand lost jobs. 1
More than a dozen corporate financial reports were found to contain
misstatements and omissions that likely were deliberate attempts to
provide misleading or false information. A few corporate executives
engaged in criminal behavior; additionally, the CEO and the board of
directors at most of those firms generally claimed to be unaware of what
was happening under their supervision. The lack of supervision by the
board also emerged as an issue when examining CEO compensation.
Were the directors who established the CEO' s salary, bonuses, stock
options and executive perks too easily influenced by the CEO?
Shareholders, particularly the large institutions, were angry at corporate
boards and officers. In the U.S., pension fund managers and other
institutional investors, not silent individual investors, now control more
than 50% of U.S. corporate equity. 2 Although criminal and civil cases
1. See 'Perp Walks' and Watchdogs Can Thwart Corporate Crime, USA TODAY, July
9, 2004, at lOA. This editorial notes that indictments and criminal charges have been
brought against executives at Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Tyco and Health South. Since
January 2002, the federal Enron Task Force has charged 29 former Enron executives and
outside advisers with crimes associated with Enron's accounting fraud. Id.
2. New York Stock Exchange, Institutional Investors: Ownership of U.S. Equities, at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/06_INSTITUTIONALINVESTORS.pdf (last visited Mar. 29,
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are still pending against many executives involved in the scandals, the
U.S. Congress quickly reacted to the outrage by passing the most
significant corporate accountability change in several decades-the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 3
In Japan, the primary reason for governance reform was the
realization that Japanese corporations must reform business operations
and organizational structures to remain competitive with U.S., European
and Chinese firms. A second agent for reform was the dramatic change
in the composition of shareholders. Banks and other stable customer or
supplier firms that owned and were owned by keiretsu partner firms
once were dominant shareholders; however, in recent years institutional
funds and individual investors have grown in influence. 4 With crossshareholding clearly diminishing, many Japanese firms no longer could
count on shareholders whose concerns were focused more on long-term
business relationships than on the return on their investments. 5 Instead,
they now must react to concerns about corporate profitability and a
firm's return on investment from institutional investors in Japan and
abroad. Finally, as in the United States, Japan has had a number of
corporate scandals that have diminished investor trust in Japanese
corporations. In Japan, when corporate scandals involve illegal or
unethical behavior, usually some officers resign in disgrace, but little
change in corporate accountability occurs. Scandals have affected such
well-known enterprises as Yukijirushi Nippon Meat Packer and Tokyo
Electric in the past few years. 6 At Yukijirushi, because the management
did not know how to react to a major food poisoning scandal, the firm
2005). Based on data from the Federal Reserve Board's flow of funds, as of the third quarter
of 2000, institutional investors held $9.7 trillion or 50.8% of U.S. equities. Id.
3. See 'Perp Walks' and Watchdogs Can Thwart Corporate Crime, supra note 1. As of
July 10, 2004 five Enron executives, including Chairman Kenneth Lay and CEO Jeff
Skilling are currently awaiting trial. John Rigas, the former CEO of Adelphia has been
convicted, but former CEOs Bernard Ebbers of World Com, Dennis Kozlowski of Tyco and
Richard Scrushy of Health South each awaits trial on fraud-related charges. See id. A
detailed report on who has been charged, who is being questioned and why is available from
CBS Market Watch at http://cbs.marketwatch.com/news/features/scandal_sheet.asp (last
visited Mar. 29, 2005); see generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266 (2002).
4. See Hidetaka Kawakita, The Attitude of Investors Since 1990s, 32 NISSAY REs. INST.
47 (April 2004). The report notes that the Japanese capital market is now changing to the
place where individual investors as well as institutional investors have grown in influence.
Id.
5. See Fumiaki Kuroki, The Relationship of Companies and Banks as CrossShareholdings Unwind-Fiscal 2002 Cross-Shareholding Survey, NISSA Y RESEARCH
INSTITUTE
(2003),
available
at
http://www.nliresearch.co.jp/eng/resea/econo/eco031118.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
6. See Hideaki Kubori, Shacho no Ketsudan ga Kaisha wo Mamoru [The Decision of a
CEO Protects a Corporation], NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUNSHA 35, 63, 179 (2003).
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went bankrupt. Executives were forced to resign due to the mislabeling
of beef at Nippon Meat Packers and because false inspection data was
used to conceal problems at nuclear power plants operated by Tokyo
Electric. Even Mitsubishi Motors was caught in covering up decades of
customer complaints about defective vehicles.
I. LEGAL REFORMS IN THE UNITED STATES

In the United States, after the eruption of numerous corporate
scandals and an outcry to do something to ensure such scandals would
not continue, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on July 30,
2002 and created a new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
to oversee the audits of public companies. Some major provisions of the
Act deal with whom in the firm is responsible for internal controls and
financial reporting, the authority and expertise of the audit committee
and the role of the audit committee vis-a-vis external auditors. Its
provisions affect officers and directors of public companies and
mandates changes in the relationship between the firms and their
outside auditors. 7 The Act affects U.S. public companies, foreign firms
(including, of course, some Japanese firms) subject to the U.S.
securities laws, public accounting firms and regulatory bodies like the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ. 8 Since the Act's
passage, both the SEC and the major stock exchanges have imposed
new requirements on public firms. 9
The SEC has adopted a dozen major rulemaking initiatives in
response to the Act's requirements. 10 The rules deal with insider trading
reports, the independence of outside auditors, the need for board
approval of auditor services, new and accelerated disclosure
requirements and reports on internal controls over financial reporting. 11

7. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, P.L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 787 (codified as amended
in 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7209 (2005)) [hereinafter SOX].
8. "Issuer" means any firm that issues registered securities, following the definition
found in section 3 of the Security and Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. §78c). SOX, 15
U.S.C.S. § 7201(7) (2005). Foreign public accounting firms are expressly subject to the
rules of the Accounting Oversight Board. Id. at § 7216; For a comprehensive list of post
SOX
SEC
rules
related
to
corporate
governance,
see
http://www.protivi.com/knowledge/sec.rptrs/index.html.
9. Stephen Labaton, Will Reforms With Few Teeth Be Able to Bite?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
22, 2002.
10. See Bryan Cave LLP, Corporate Finance Bulletin, Sarbanes-Oxley and SEC
Corporate Governance Rules and Proposals Summary (June 13, 2003), available at
http://www.byancave.com/files/tbl_s7Publications%5CDetails33%5C849%5CSSarbanesSECRulesSummary6-13-03.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2005).
11. Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154 (Nov. 12, 2003)
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Both the NYSE and NASDAQ also address the independence of board
members, as well as other issues noted infra. Taken together, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC rules and the NYSE and NASDAQ rules
address three main areas of corporate governance: corporate
accountability and disclosure, the independence of the board of
directors and the role of auditors. 12 As the independence of the directors
affects both the role and compensation for the CEO, the CEO's role visa-vis the board also has become a governance concern.
A. Corporate Accountability and Disclosure
According to agency theory, the board of directors of a corporation
is accountable to the shareholders who elect them and corporate officers
are accountable to the board of directors who place them in charge of
day-to-day operations. In the United States, the board's primary role is
seen as providing oversight or monitoring to ensure the actions of its
managers are effective, legal and even ethical. Although board members
are there to monitor the actions of the managers, some board members
in firms involved in the financial scandals said they did not know about
their firm's significant financial activities. Enron's Board was criticized
for failing to ask pertinent questions or to seek explanations regarding
the nature of the partnership transactions that moved debt off the firm's
balance sheet. 13
In addition to being accountable to their owners, modem
stakeholder theory usually holds the corporation's board of directors
accountable to its stakeholders-employees, suppliers, customers and
community officials. 14 According to Professor Cindy Schipani of the
University of Michigan Business School:

(providing the SEC's approval of NYSE and NASDAQ rule changes); Notice of Filing of
Proposed Rule on Auditing Standard No. 2, 69 Fed. Reg. 20,672 (Apr. 16, 2004) (providing
notice of auditing standards rules proposed by the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board); and 17 C.F.R. 228.10-.703, (adding disclosure requirements for the nominating
committee and communications between security holders and board members per NASDAQ
and NYSE rules approved by the SEC).
12. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7231-34 (2005) (auditor independence requirements); see 15
U.S.C.S. §§7241-46 (2005) (corporate accountability requirements); see also 68 Fed. Reg.
64,154 (Nov. 12, 2003) (detailing requirement of independence for some company board
members, pursuant to NASDAQ and NYSE rules approved by the SEC).
13. See Reed Abelson, Enron 's Many Strands: The Directors; Enron 's Board Quickly
Ratified Far-Reaching Management Moves, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at C6.
14. See R.E. Freeman, A Stakeholder Theory of the Modem Corporation, in ETHICAL
THEORY & BUSINESS 56 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds., Prentice Hall 6th
ed. 2001).
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the accountability of corporate boards in corporate
governance has evolved over the years, and, courts and
legislatures often are caught in balancing acts. Historically,
the challenge was to strike a balance between holding
directors accountable to shareholders and not overly
constraining their ability to perform their job. But these are
not the only balances that need to be considered. Most states
permit that in making certain corporate decisions, officers
and directors can consider the welfare of other corporate
constituencies in addition to shareholders. Once the facts of
the Enron and other situations fully come to light, questions
will arise not only about accounting practices and regulations
but also about the role of the board of directors and its
oversight function. Only time will tell how these issues will
be resolved, but it wouldn't be surprising to find the courts
and legislatures strengthening the board's oversight function
in an effort to promote more corporate accountability. 15
Corporate laws in the United States, which require directors to act
in an informed manner, do give directors and officers the flexibility to
balance shareholders' interest against other stakeholders. 16
The corporate scandals also brought to the forefront another
problem, ensuring the accuracy of information. Although it may seem
reasonable to assume that the CEO is the one person who in the end is
accountable for all corporate information, the legal responsibility for
certain information needs to be clear. Former Enron CEO Jeffrey
Skilling said he was unaware of the company's questionable partnership
practices that were used to conceal debt from Enron shareholders, "this
was a very large corporation. It would be impossible to know
everything going on." 17
Because of such statements, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires both
the CEO and the CFO to sign and file, with the company's lOK and 10Q forms, their certifications regarding the effectiveness of the

15. See Cindy Schipani, Crisis in Corporate America, available at
http://www.bus.umich.edu/FacultyResearch/Research/Crisis.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
16. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing
Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REv. 579, 634 (1992); Steven M. H. Wallman,
Understanding the Purpose of the Corporation: An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L 807, 809-10,
812 (1999).
17. See Stephen Labaton & Richard A Oppel, Jr., Enron 's Many Strands: The
Overview; Testimony of Enron Executives is Contradictory, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at
Al,C8.
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company's internal controls over financial reporting as well as the
adequacy and accuracy of disclosures contained in the reports. 18 The
Annual Report must contain an "internal control report," which shall
state the responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining
an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial
reporting. At the end of the issuer's fiscal year, a report must assess the
effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures of the
issuer for financial reporting. 19
B. Independence, Size and Knowledge of the Board ofDirectors

Boards of directors are crucial to a strong corporate structure.
While managers are selected to operate the firm, the directors "are
representatives of the shareholders, whose purpose under the law is to
safeguard the assets of the corporation."20 The distinction between the
board as a monitor of managers and also as being responsible for the use
of firm assets is not always clear, particularly where the board member
is also an executive of the firm. The independence of board members is
critical because the board occupies an important role: "it must balance
two distinct powers-the power of those who own the corporation and
the power of those who run it. A corporation depends on shareholders
for capital, but reserves the day to day running of enterprise for
management. " 21
Board members are supposed to exercise their independent
judgment in making corporate decisions. However, while directors are
elected by corporate shareholders, in practice their selection usually can
be traced directly to the CEO. This may be particularly true because
U.S. board members, who usually are all from outside the firm, may be
unable to devote sufficient time or have the requisite knowledge of the
firm's problems. Consequently, they are unable or unwilling to impose
restraint in setting either CEO or board members compensation and
benefit packages or to challenge operational plans favored by the
executives. In the United States, the push for greater outside
representation on boards started in the 1970s because outside directors
were thought to bring greater independence to their oversight role.
However, Cynthia Glassman, a SEC Commissioner, noted in a recent

18. SOX, Pub. L. No. 107-204, Title IV, §404, 116 Stat. 789 (codified as amended in
15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. 2004)).
19. SOX, Enhanced Financial Disclosures, 15 U.S.C.S. §7262 (2005).
20. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA.L. REv. 247, 299-315 (1999).
21 . See ROBERT MONKS & NEIL MINNOW' CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 164 (2d ed. 2001 ).
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speech that "[a]s we examined various scandals that had occurred,
director independence increasingly was seen as a missing element
necessary to position the [b ]oard to oversee management, foster
integrity and prevent such misbehavior from occurring. " 22 Thus, while
U.S. directors, unlike their Japanese counterparts, usually are from
outside the corporation, their friendship with and dependence upon the
CEO means they lack needed independence.
Although both the NYSE and NASDAQ now require a majority of
a publicly traded corporation's board to be independent, they differ
slightly as to how to best determine such independence. The NYSE
specifies that a director who has a "material relationship" with the listed
company cannot be considered independent. The NASDAQ directive
defines an "independent director" as one who is not an employee of the
company and who does not have a relationship which, in the opinion of
the company's board, would interfere with the exercise of independent
judgment in carrying out the responsibilities of a director. 23 Companies
listed on the exchanges must, with some exceptions, have compensation
and nominating committees composed solely of independent directors. 24
The SEC rules support requiring the nominating committee members to
be independent of management. 25 Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the
NASDAQ and NYSE will be required to de-list companies that do not
comply with the new rules on independence.
To be effective, boards must have some meetings at which only
independent members are present. To help insure independence and
lessen the possibility of conflicting interests affecting the judgment of
board members, directors' fees must be the sole compensation for
independent directors, although these fees can vary due to different
director responsibilities. The payments can be in cash, stock and/or
22. Cynthia A Glaasman, Board Independence and the Evolving Role of Directors,
Securities & Exchange Comm'n, at http://www.sec.gov.speechspch022004cag.htm (last
visited Feb. 5, 2005) (quoting Roberta S. Karmel, The Independent Board, A Means to What
End?, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 534, 538-48 (1984)).
23. NASDAQ's Rule 4200 (a)(14), (15) prohibits a former employee of a public
company or any of its subsidiaries if employed during the preceding three years or whose
relative accepted $60,000 or more during said period from the company to be considered
independent. Id.
24. See SEC Notice 68 Fed. Reg. 64154 (Nov. 4, 2003) (noting NYSE and NASDAQ
Rules that allow for a non-independent director to be a member of the nominating
committee if the board, under exceptional and limited exceptions, determines that to be in
the best interest of the company and its shareholders).
25. Id. The SEC statement reads "The Commission believes that directors that are
independent of management are more likely to support the nomination of qualified
independent directors and that a written document governing the nominating committee is
beneficial." Id.
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options. Public companies are prohibited from making, or arranging for,
personal loans for any director or executive officer. 26
In addition to the selection process and independence of directors,
the size of the board may have an influence on a board's effectiveness.
A board that is too big may be unworkable.
In 1993, Rawleigh Warner, a director of American Express at the
time, noted, "the size of a [b ]oard does make a difference. The
American Express Board had 19 members and four advisors to the
Board. That large a board, I believe, makes for an unwieldy number
and prevents an opportunity for each member to speak freely." 27
Warner's comments seem to have been listened to. According to
Spencer Stuart's survey of large U.S. companies, the average board size
was 15 in 1988 and 12 in 1998.0ur survey shows the average size of
boards at the 30 DJ firms in 2004 was 12.5.28
A final issue related to corporate directors concerns their
knowledge, particularly of financial and accounting issues. Members of
the Enron board of directors have been criticized for their lack of
attention to the off-book financial entities with which Enron did
business. Special requirements for the audit committee of the board are
discussed below. Similarly, there is a need for the board of directors to
make sure they have access to all needed information. The directors
should have ultimate approval over information flow to the board,
meeting agendas, and meeting schedules to ensure that they have
sufficient time for discussion of all agenda items. 29
C. The Role ofAuditors and the Audit Committee

The Enron scandal, which caused the downfall of Arthur Andersen,
also raised questions about the duties and responsibilities of a firm's
auditors. When lead partners and local offices derive significant parts of
their income from a key client, objectivity may disappear. Auditors who
have long-standing relations with their clients may lack the critical eye
that is necessary to the performance of their tasks. As for internal
auditors, they need to make sure that they, as well as the directors on the
board's audit committees, have access to necessary information. Robert

26. SOX, P.L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 787, § 402(a) (codified as amended in 15
U.S.C.S. § 78m(k)(l) (2002).
27. MONKS AND MINNOW, supra note 21, at 166.
28. See Table 1 infra at 208.
29. See
Gary
Gray,
Corporate
Governance,
available
at
http://www.gcwf.com/gcc/GrayGaryC/Practice-A/Corp/cgbdirpt.doc_cvt.htm (last visited
Apr. 17, 2005).
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Jaedicke, a former Stanford Business School Dean, stated to lawmakers
that he and other members of Enron' s audit committee were misled
through years of inaccurate earning reports. He said:
The lifeblood of the work of any [a]udit [c]ommittee is
the development and implementation of adequate controls,
many of which cross check each other. And the oversight
function of the [c]ommittee depends on the full and complete
reporting of information to it. Without full and accurate
information, an [a]udit [c]ommittee cannot be effective. 30
He blamed Enron' s management and outside consultants for providing
incorrect information.
Both Sarbanes-Oxley and the NYSE requirements include
provisions to increase the authority and responsibilities of the board's
audit committee and to ensure that it has the necessary independence
and expertise. 31 The audit committee must have the sole authority to
hire and fire a company's independent auditor and to pre-approve any
significant non-audit relationship with the independent auditor. The
audit committee also must have the ability to engage independent
counsel and other expert advisors. 32 SOX requires that each member of
a publicly traded board's audit committee must be "independent."
Under this requirement, a director is not independent if the director has
received any consulting or other fees outside his or her capacity as
director or committee member, or if the director is affiliated with the
company or its subsidiary. This standard excludes from audit committee
membership representatives of large stockholders, and it is stricter than
the NYSE and NASDAQ rules, which include some exceptions. 33
At least one director must qualify as a financial expert who, among
other things, understands generally accepted accounting principles and
has experience in preparing, auditing, analyzing or evaluating financial

30. Financial Collapse of Enron Corp.: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce (2002) (prepared
testimony of Robert Jaedicke, Chairman of the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors
of
Enron
Corp.),
available
at
http:energycommerce.house.gov/107/hearings/02072002hearing485/Jaedicke798.htm (last
visited Mar. 29, 2005).
31. See Jane Padget, Major Changes of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Jan. 2, 2003)
available at http://www.kc.frb.org/bs&s/confer/2003regupdate/Sarbanes_Oxley .doc. (last
visited Mar. 29, 2005).
32. SOX, §301(5), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2004).
33. See Gray, supra note 29.
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statements that present a breadth and level of complexity of accounting
issues reasonably expected to be raised. 34 Professor Hideki Kanda of
Tokyo University, suggests that both independence and "financial
literacy" should be required for all members of a board's audit
committee. 35 New NYSE and NASDAQ requirements specify that all
members of an audit committee must be financially literate, with at least
one member having extensive accounting or financial management
expertise. 36Additionally, SEC rules require firms to disclose whether
they have an "audit committee financial expert" on the committee and if
not, why not.
Since external auditors are hired to check on the corporation's
financial records, it is unlikely that corporate executives who are
responsible for maintaining those records will want aggressive
independent auditors if the executives themselves have reason to believe
the records can be questioned. Responsibility for hiring external
auditors should rest with independent board members, not with
corporate executives in charge of financial records. As auditor
independence is a crucial issue for corporate governance, SOX imposes
several requirements related to partner rotation, auditor's reporting,
cooling off period, and prohibited activities. Auditors are also
prohibited from providing other work such as appraisal or valuation
services, actuarial services, investment banking services and legal
services unrelated to the audit. 37
II. LEGAL REFORMS IN JAPAN
Japan's revised Commercial Code, effective April 1, 2003, sought
"to create a corporate governance system so as to revitalize Japanese
corporations and to establish a corporate decision-making system with
greater agility and mobility."38 Some proponents of change wanted to
require all major firms to adopt a new governance system, but when
business opposition arose, the compromise of offering options,

34. SOX, P.L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 787, § 407.
35. See Hideki Kanda, Beikoku ni Okeru Corporate Governance no Saishin Jokyo
[Current Situation of Corporate Governance in the U.S.] KANSAYAKU No. 437, 20 (2001).
36. KANSAS CITY FEDERAL RESERVE BANK, Major Changes of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of
2002,
Jan.
2,
2003
available
at
http://www.kansascityfed.org/bx&s/confer/2003RegUpdate/Sarbanes_Oxley .doc
(last
visited Mar. 23, 2005).
37. SOX, Pub. L. No. 107-204, Title IV,§ 201(a), 116 Stat. 789.
38. Shigeru Morimoto et al., Discussion Concerning Options for Corporate
Governance System and the Future Development, TORISHIMARIY AKU No HOMU [LAW
JOURNAL FOR DIRECTORS], July 25, 2002, at 11.
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including the option of not making any change, was adopted. 39 "The
option to use a 'Company with Committees' system was intended to
make clear the distinction between the oversight and operational
function in a corporation." 40
Several major cultural elements found in most Japanese firms stand
out as affecting corporate governance. They include the development of
harmony and the use of a different decision-making process among lifelong corporate employees; the central role of a main bank; and the
cross-shareholding among keiretsu members. However, the new reality
is that the influence of these factors has been significantly diminished.
The decline in the use of each of these attributes of Japanese corporate
culture has led firms to examine their corporate structures and to place
greater emphasis on profitability and the return on investments.
A. Cultural Elements Affecting Corporate Governance

Decision-making processes in Japanese corporations differ from
those in use in the U.S. For example, based on the Japanese philosophy
of "ringiseido," participative decision-making from various levels is
considered to stimulate group harmony and to provide a feeling of
participation. 41 While it takes patience to work through the decisionmaking process, those who have participated through the "ringi"
process see it as their responsibility to implement the decision. The
strength of communication and mutual understanding among multiple
levels of management played an important part in the development of
the corporate culture while also providing trust and stability that
allowed firms to reduce monitoring and reporting costs. However, as
decisions are based on a consensus, where no one decision-maker can
be identified, the process is very weak on accountability.
Another unique feature of the Japanese governance system has
been that banks, which were key shareholders of many firms, frequently
served as external monitors in charge of a corporation's governance. A
"main bank," generally had a very special relationship with one or more
companies and served multiple functions: providing loans, serving as a
major shareholder and dispatching their own staff to serve as company

39. See Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt., Choice as Regulatory Reform: The
Case of Japanese Corporate Governance, at http://ssm.com/abstract=537843 (last visited
Mar. 23, 2005).
40. See Masamitsu Shiseki et. al, 2002 Revision of Commercial Code of Japan, 1658
BANKING L. J. 64 (2002).
41. See Ilan Alon, Japanese Corporate Management in Transition, at
http://aib.msu.edu/publications/insights/insights_v3nl .pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2005).
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officers. 42 These "main banks" were positioned at the very core of
corporate governance. Ryuji Konishi, a former managing director of
Long Term Credit Bank, speaking about the role of banks in corporate
governance noted:
Banks centered on top of the government system. Banks
intervened in a company's management at the time of its
financial distress. Banks reinforced mutual relationship
among stakeholders through cross shareholdings. Banks
thought it was them who maintained and drove the system.
They thought they were the Governor of the system. All the
stakeholders' relationship and even the Market were often
internalized by the banks and there had been lack of [sic]
pure outsiders' check system. It is quite an irony that they
thought they were the master of the system and ordered
others to do this and that for restructure, proved merely a
puppet of MOP and awfully inept to tackle with their own
restructuring. 43
Also unique to Japan is the nature of "cross shareholding" among
companies, particularly with banks. Initially, cross shareholding
centered on the former zaibatsu groups for the purpose of preventin~ the
hoarding of stock after the liberalization of securities in the 1950s. In
the 1960s cross shareholding was used by companies with close
business relationships, such as keiretsu or corporate groups, and to
prevent stock acquisition by foreign companies. In the 1980s cross
shareholding aggressively promoted large volume equity financing
during the "bubble" economy period. Benefits of cross-shareholding
include stable management as the shareholders back the managers and
reinforcement of existing business relations especially if the returns
from the stock investments in partner firms increase in value.
Each of these components of Japanese corporate culture has
changed, some of them quite dramatically, in the last two decades.
Globalization has forced many firms to move operations into China and
elsewhere so the process of continually hiring new university graduates

42. See, e.g., Paul Sheard, The Main Bank System and Corporate Monitoring and
Control in Japan, 11 J. ECON. BEHAV. & 0RG. 399, 402 (1989); MITSUAKI 0KABE, CROSS
SHAREHOLDINGS IN JAPAN 27 (2003).

43. Ryuji Konishi, Japanese Bank's Failure, Remarks at Asian Conference in Harvard
Business School (Feb. 6, 1999).
44. See Kuroki, supra note 5, at 1.
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and impliedly guaranteeing them life-long employment has had to be
discarded at many firms. Thus, the close relationships among workers
and their managers, most of whom were lifetime employees, are
changing. The main bank's role has likewise declined. Due to the
deterioration of the banks due to bad loan problems, bank financing has
been gradually replaced by fund procurement in capital markets. As a
result, the main bank's influence on corporate governance has
diminished. Similarly, although cross-shareholding brought benefits
when stock prices rose, as prices continued to drop, firms began to sell
cross-shareholdings.
In the last decade both stable long-term
shareholding and cross shareholdings have decreased significantly, with
cross-shareholding falling to 7.2% in 2002, only half the level that
existed a decade earlier. 45
As a result of the changes, more firms are now without strong bank
financiers and keiretsu allies, who can be counted on to help look after
their common interests. To be competitive in the global marketplace
both the sourcing and methods of operations and the attraction of
needed capital have to be more in line with global standards. Firms
looking for global recognition, markets and capital were expected to
eliminate corporate scandals and "to attain better performance through
an enhanced corporate governance structure." 46 In matters specifically
related to corporate governance, the firms found that the U.S. system
operated as a de facto global standard. 47
B. Recognition of the need for Corporate Governance Reform

In addition to experiencing the changes occurring in Japanese
corporate culture, the occurrence of several scandals in the late nineteen
nineties and the early years of the new millennium convinced many
executives and their advisors that compliance with legal and social
standards, along with meeting higher investment performance
expectations, are keys to corporate governance. Attorney Hideaki
Kubori notes,
Nowadays, just one inappropriate act by an on-site
employee can destroy a brand name and ruin a company. The

45. See Kuroki, supra note 5, at 1.
46. See Hideaki Miyajima, Sen Taku ni Chokumnen suru Nihon Kigyo [Japanese
Corporations at the Crossroad], Waseda.com on Asahi.com, 2003/09/07, available at
http://organization.web.waseda.ac.jp/finance/2003314.pdf.
47. Etsuko Katsu, GLOBAL CAPITAL REVOLUTION 14, 21, 25 (TOYO KEIZAI SHINPOSHA
1998).
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time is now for top management to urgently build a system in
which compliance takes root, through methods most suited to
the company. If compliance is deficient, the all-important
brand image will be seriously tainted. And damage to brand
leads directly to the collapse of company organization. A
definitive example is the food poisoning incident at
Yukijirushi that began on June 27, 2000, the day before the
shareholders meeting. 48
Another important aspect of corporate governance is to attain
better performance. If companies do not take reasonable risks, better
performance (return) cannot be created. Professor Takeaki Kariya of
Meiji University concludes, "No uncertainty, no need for
management. " 49
As board members were almost always also corporate managers,
the composition of the boards made it unlikely that the board would
monitor managers. Instead, statutory auditors functioned to monitor
both the execution of actions taken by the board and the internal control
and conduct of the company. 50 Although statutory auditors are used in
several countries, their role is not well understood. The statutory auditor
generally exists as a means of "monitoring the legal conformity of
business conducted by directors." 51 Generally, statutory auditors in
Japan have been executives of other companies, people from a firm's
main bank, its lawyers, or people with which the firm has continuing
business relationships.
In 2001, the Commercial Code was revised to strengthen the
auditing system in several respects. Nobuo Nakamura, Professor of Law
at W aseda University explains several of the changes. First, the revision
requires that a resigning auditor be granted the right to state his or her
opinions at the shareholders meeting. 52 Second, the length of term
served by a statutory auditor was extended from three to four years as of

48. See Kubori, supra note 6, at 1.
49. See Takeaki Kariya, Fudosan Kinyukogaku towa nanika [What is the financial
engineering about real estate?], TOYO KEIZAI SHIMPOSHA, at 17 (2003).
50. COMMERCIAL
CODE
OF
JAPAN,
§
274
(1),
at
http://www.kansa.or.jp/english/com_Ol .html (last visited Mar. 23, 2005 [hereinafter
COMMERCIAL CODE].
51. See J-IRIS Research Newsletter, Issue No. 2, at 4 (Oct. 2002), available at
http://www.j-iris.com/newsletter/n 102/pdf.
52. See Noburo Nakamura, Corporate Governance in Japan: Today and Tomorrow,
34 JAPAN ECON. CURRENTS 6 (July 2003), at http://www.kkc-usa.org/files/3177/JEC-July03-132K.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2005).
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December 2001. s3 It also increased the number of statutory outside
auditors to three or more and requires that the majority of auditors be
from outside the firm. s4 Under the new definition outside statutory
auditors must not presently be, nor have been a director, a general
manager, or an employee in some other capacity of the company or its
subsidiaries.ss Finally, the 2001 revisions require "the board of
directors of large corporations to secure approval from the board of
statutory auditors before submitting a slate of statutory auditors for
approval at a shareholders meeting."s 6 As of the first shareholders'
meeting occurring after May 1, 2005, the 2001 Code revisions impose
the changes on the statutory auditors of all firms not opting for the new
"Company with Committees" governance system.
C. The 2003 Revisions in the Japanese Commercial Code

Prior to the April 1, 2003 changes to the Commercial Code, aside
from the role of the statutory auditors, boards in Japanese firms
appeared to serve the same function as their U.S. counterparts. s7 The
board of directors elected by shareholders (and thus responsible to
them) sets overall corporate policies and direction and appoints and
monitors the company executives who implement these policies. The
reality, however, was that as the members of the board were all from
inside the firm, the interests of the employees, as distinct from the
interests of individual managers and employees, was paramount in the
board's decision-making.
The distinction between oversight and operational functions has
not been clear because the members of the board of directors were also
executives in charge of company operations. The Code acknowledges
the dual role of board members. According to Commercial Code § 260
( 1), "The board of directors decides the operation of a company and
monitors the execution of directors. ,,ss The reality of the governance
structure of Japanese companies has been as follows:

53. COMMERCIAL CODE § 273 (1 ).
54. The Japanese Law for Special Exceptions to the Commercial Code Concerning
Audits, etc. of Corporations§ 18 (1).
55. See id.
56. Nakamura, supra note 52, at 7.
57. See Stephen Prowse, Corporate Governance in International Perspective: A Survey
of Corporate Control Mechanisms Among Large Firms in the United States, the United
Kingdom, Japan and Germany, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS ECON. PAPERS No. 41, 43
(July 1994).
58. COMMERCIAL CODE§ 274 (1).
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1. Almost all directors are appointed or, to be more exact,
promoted internally.
2. Almost all directors are also executives or managers who
therefore face conflicts on many matters. There is no clear
distinction between monitoring and operating.
3. The outgoing CEO usually appoints a new CEO.
4. The power and authority of CEOs is often not questioned.
The 2003 revised Commercial Code gives companies three options
for their governance system: (1) keep their conventional governance
system; (2) establish a decision-making committee regarding major
assets in addition to a corporate auditor system; or (3) establish a new
corporate governance structure known as the "Company with
Committees" system. 59 For companies electing the first choice, the only
change in the decision-making of the board is the change required for
the statutory auditor. As for the second choice, the purpose of setting up
a major asset committee is for it to make decisions relative to the
disposal of important assets of a company. Traditionally, only the board
of directors could make such decisions. 60 The determination by a firm to
have a major asset committee can be decided by a board of at least 10
members and one outside director. The major asset committee must be
composed of at least three board members. 61 Although to date only
Honda has adopted this system, it is anticipated more companies will do
so. Honda explained its adoption of this system in its recent financial
report: "[I]n order to ensure proactive decision-making, the Board of
Directors set up an Assets and Loan Management Committee, which is
responsible for making decisions related to the disposal of the
Company's important assets. " 62 If the third choice is elected, three
committees and the representative corporate officer system replace the
conventional corporate auditor system. Toshiba Corporation captures
the possible benefits of the new governance system:
[U]nder the previous Commercial Code, the board of

59. The Japanese Law for Special Exceptions to the Commercial Code Concerning
Audits, etc. of Corporations at § 1-2 (3).
60. See id.§ 1-3 (1).
61. See id.§ 1-3 (3).
62. HONDA MOTOR Co., Consolidated Financial Results for the Fiscal Second Quarter

and

the

First

Half

Ended

September

30,

2003,

at

http://world.honda.com/investors/financialresult/2004/2003 _2nd/25 .html (last visited Mar.
24, 2005) (discussing management of the company).
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directors was legally responsible for both execution and
supervision. Under Japan's revised Commercial Code, the
Company with Committees system articulates a division of
legal responsibility between the executive officers and the
board: It provides for executive officers to execute business,
while the board concentrates on supervision of management.
Executive officers will be able to act with greater agility and
mobility to meet the challenges of the business
environment. 63
The committees required include an audit committee, nominating
committee and compensation committee. As the Toshiba note suggests,
the major change with this system is that firms must transfer to
executives who are not members of the board the responsibility for
running the business. 64
D. Governance Under the "Company with Committees" System

Toshiba explained the purpose for its adoption of the new
governance system "as a means to further enhance corporate
governance by reinforcing supervisory functions and manafement
transparency and to improve operating agility and flexibility. " 6 Other
companies that select this option likely anticipate that as they become
more accountable, they will also be more competitive by increasing
their corporate value and eliminating corporate corruption through the
enhanced corporate governance system.
The audit committee monitors both the appropriateness and the
legal conformity of business carried out by both directors and executive
officers. 66 The selection of external auditors must be approved by
shareholders and the audit committee is empowered to submit to
shareholders a proposal to elect and remove external auditors. 67 All
members of the audit committee are prohibited from serving as
executive officers or employees of the company or any subsidiary, and
63. TOSHIBA CORPORATION, Toshiba to adopt "Company with Committees System,"
available at http://www.toshiba.co.jp/about/press/2003_01/pr2903.htm (last visited Mar. 24,
2005).
64. The Japanese Law for Special Exceptions to the Commercial Code concerning
Audits, etc. of Corporations§ 21-5 (1).
65. See TOSHIBA, supra note 63.
66. HIROSHI MAEDA ET. AL, CORPORATE KAIKAKU No ZITSUMU [CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE PRACTICE UNDER THE REVISED COMMERCIAL CODE] 236 (Nihon Keizai
Shinbunsha 2003).
67. See id. at 237.
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from holding management position in any subsidiary. 68 There is,
however, no provision that would bar keiretsu member representatives
or others who have a material relationship with a firm from being on the
audit committee. The nominating committee determines the content of
proposals pertaining to the election and removal of directors at
shareholders meeting. The board of directors retains the right to elect
and remove members of the committees; the nominating committee is
not involved in that function. The compensation committee determines
the compensation for each director and executive officer. At least three
board members are to be on each committee with the majority of
committee members being outside directors.
As far as the independence of board members, company executives
may serve as members of the nominating or compensation committee,
but not of the auditing committee. 69 Committee members cannot be
regarded as outside directors if: ( 1) they are current or former
employees, or (2) they are current or former directors working at the
same time as executive officers of the company. 70 Despite the changes,
the newly revised Code in Japan does not ensure a board in this new
system will be composed mostly of independent members who can
perform the monitoring function without a conflict. This is because the
Code does not require that corporations adopting the new system have a
majority of outside directors on the board. 7 Indeed, it permits directors
concurrently serving as executive officers to constitute a majority.
Moreover, the definition of "an outside director" does not require
independence. Therefore, directors from a parent company, from a main
bank or from companies with material relationships can be considered
as outside directors. Thus, the definition of what makes a director
independent is less restricted in Japan than in the U.S.

III. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN U.S. CORPORATIONS
The reforms imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation and the
NYSE and NASDAQ rules require U.S. corporations to address a
number of governance issues related to the size and composition of
boards, the independence of board members, the separation of the CEO
and chairman positions and several other related concerns. An
examination of what is happening with these concerns in the 30 DJ

68. The Japanese Law for Special Exceptions to the Commercial Code Concerning
Audits, etc. of Corporations § 21-8 (7).
69. Id. at§ 21-8 (4).
70. COMMERCIAL CODE § 188 (2), 7 .2.
71. See MAEDA ET. AL., supra note 66, at 55.
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Industrial firms is provided below. The role of the firm auditors and the
expressed importance of non-shareholder stakeholders also are
reviewed.
The governance changes occurring at these firms have been quite
extensive. For example, General Motors developed guidelines in thirtyfive areas ranging from the selection of new board members to the size
of the board and the board's relationship with senior management. 72
GM's guidelines included those involving the selection and composition
of the board, board leadership, the board's composition and
performance, the board's relationship to senior management, meeting
procedures, committee matters and leadership development. 73 General
Electric' s Governance Principles include both the independence of
directors and the independence of committee members. Meetings of
non-employee directors, reporting concerns to non-employee directors
and succession planning are also topics noted in the GE policies. 74
A. Summary of Governance Structures at the 30 Dow Jones firms

TABLE 1: Composite View of DJ 30 Boards and CEO Governance
Board Size

The average board has 12.5 members.

Number of Inside
Directors

The average number of inside
directors is 1.8. Only 6 firms have
more than 2 inside directors.

Who are the Inside
Directors?

The CEO and Chairman are the only
inside directors at 16 firms.

CEO & Chairman

The CEO and Chairman are separated
at 7 firms. The former Chair or
President sits on 2 Boards.

*

Data is based on home pages as of July 1, 2004.

Table 1 depicts a composite of the governance structure in the

72. General
Motors,
Corporate
Governance
Guidelines,
available
at
http://www.gm.com/company/investor_information/corp_gov/guidelines.html (last visited
Mar. 21, 2005).
73. Id.

74. General
Electric,
Governance
Principles,
available
http://www.ge.com/en/spotlight/commitment/governance/governance_principles.htm
visited Mar. 21, 2005).
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Dow Jones 30 as of July 1, 2004, and by extension in corporate
America. The data shows the size of the board averages just over 12
members, with only one or two inside directors and with a firm's CEO
also being the chairman of the board.
Table 2, which depicts the size and number of inside members of
the boards at each of the 30 Dow Jones' firms, shows board size varies
from as few as 9 members at Hewlett-Packard to as many as 17 at SBC.
The average number of members is 12.5, with eight firms having 11
members and six having 12. Although one might expect most boards to
have an odd number of members, in fact 60% of the thirty firms have an
even number of members.

TABLE 2: Board Size and Number of Inside Directors at DJ 30
Firms
Firms

Board
size
11
11

3M Company
iAlcoa Inc.
~ltria Group
~erican

Number
ot Position of Insiders
inside directors

10

1
1
1

13

~

10
10

1

Chairman &CEO

[Express
~T&TCorp.

!Boeing Co.
Caterpillar Inc.
Citigroup
Coca-Cola Co
DuPont
Eastman Kodak
Exxon Mobil

14
16
16
12
11
11

~

1
3

3

5

Int] 14

1
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Chairman, CEO, President &COO

1
1
1

General Electric 16
Co.
General Motors 11
l-!ome Depot Inc 12
Hewlett-Packard ~
l-!oneywell
Inc.

President & CEO, Non-executive
Chairman

Chairman & CEO, President,
[Executive Vice President
Chairman & CEO, Vice Chairman
''3)

1
1
~

Chairman
Chairman

&

CEO,

Fonner
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Intel Corp.
IBM
Intl Paper Co.
JP Morgan Chase
Johnson
&
Johnson
McDonald

11

~

12

1

11

l2

16
13

l2

12

2

12
10

1
3

& 16

1

17
12

1
1

rwal-Mart Stores 14

~

!Walt-Disney Co. 11

B

Merck&Co
Microsoft Corp.
Procter
(Jamb le
SBC
~nited

rrechnologies

Total

*
**

374

l2
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Chairman, CEO, President & COO
Chairman & CEO, President
Chairman & CEO, President
Chairman & CEO, Executive Vice
[President &CFO
Non-Executive Chairman, Presiden1
&CEO,
Chairman, CEO, Former Presiden1
&COO

Chairman, Vice Chairman, CEO,
of
the
Executive
Chairman
Committee
Chairman, CEO, President & COO

55

When the column is blank, the only insider is the CEO.
Data based on the firms' home page's as of July 1, 2004.

As noted in Table 2, at the DJ 30 firms, each board of directors is
composed of at least nine members, with an average of 12.5, and
usually only one or two are inside directors. At 16 of the DJ 30 firms,
the CEO, who is on all of the boards (or CEO who is also the chair) is
the only insider. At two firms, Microsoft and HP, a former chairman or
president is also on the board. Where two insiders are on the board, they
are most commonly the CEO and a separate chairman. Only two boards,
General Electric and Wal-Mart, have more than three insiders.
It is in this area that the greatest contrast between U.S. and
Japanese boards exists. While almost all U.S. firms' directors are
outsiders, in Japan almost all board members are insiders. Japanese
boards are less worried about monitoring the insiders than ensuring that
the board members have the knowledge to make strategic decisions for
the firm. Most officers in Japanese companies believe outsiders are less
effective because they have less knowledge about the operations and
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol32/iss2/2
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issues facing the company. Board members who are primarily outsiders
will need to rely too much on the views and desires of those insiders.

A. Independence ofBoard Members
Having independent board members can be critical as American
Express' s experience exemplifies. In 1992, the board, at the behest of
several independent members, forced Board Chairman James Robinson
to resign. 75 Today, the governance policies at American Express define
an independent director as follows:
"A director is independent if he or she does not have a material
relationship with the Company."76 Several specific situations include
having an immediate family member who was employed as an officer
of a subsidiary or being an executive of a company that does business
with the firm and whose annual revenues from that business exceeds
1% of either company's business. 77 As of January 24, 2004, the board
determined that "nine of the Company's 12 incumbent directors were
independent under these guidelines."78
Citigroup has a long-standing commitment to an independent
board and stock ownership as the two most important components of its
corporate governance policies. Furthermore, Citigroup has adopted a
new policy that seeks to eliminate interlocking directorships.
Citigroup's governance policies include the following statements:
Director Independence: We have adopted corporate
governance guidelines requiring that at least two thirds of
our board should be independent. 79
Stock ownership commitment: Directors and members of
Citigroup agree that as directors they will continue to hold
at least 7 5% of the Citigroup stock that they own for at least
a minimum specified period ... 80

75. See MONKS & MINNOW, supra note 21, at 347.
76. American Express Company, Corporate Governance Principle, available at
http://ir.americanexpress.com/ireye/ir_site.zhtml?ticker=axp&script=2240 (last visited Mar.
21, 2005).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Citigroup, Corporate Governance, available at
(last
http://www.citigroupinfo.com/citigroup/corporategovemance/data/corpgovguide. pdf
visited Mar. 21, 2005).
80. Id.
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Interlocking Directors: No inside director or executive
officer of Citigroup shall serve as a director of a company
where a Citigroup outside Director is an executive officer. 81
Finally, "Boeing's existing governance principles call for a
'substantial majority of independent, non-management directors.'
Indeed, nine of the eleven members of Boeing's board of directors are
considered 'independent' under the NYSE's proposed tighter definition.
Boeing's board of directors also has regular executive meetings without
management present, another NYSE recommendation. " 82
B. Separation of CEO and Chairman Positions
If the chairman of the board of directors is also the CEO of the
company, how can the board, under the leadership of its chairman,
monitor the CEO and other executive managers of the company? If
governance at a corporation is to include monitoring of executives by
the board, the need to separate the positions of chairman of the board
and CEO of the company seems obvious. In early 2003, the conference
board recommended that the CEO and chairman positions be split with
the chairman position filled by an independent director. 83
Among the Dow Jones 30 firms, only seven separate the position
of CEO and chairman of the board: Boeing, Microsoft, McDonald,
Intel, Wal-Mart, Walt Disney and Citigroup. In the remaining 76.6% of
the 30 companies, the chairman of the board was also the CEO of the
company. Several firms expressed strong reasons for their decision to
separate the two positions. The Guidelines for Intel Corporation's
Board of Directors specifically require the separation of the position of
Chairman and CEO as an aid in the board's oversight of management.
"The Board's general policy, based on experience, is that the positions
of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer should be held
by separate Eersons as an aid in the Board's oversight of
Management." 4 At Boeing, the company separated the position of CEO
81. Id.
82. Boeing Company, Corporate Governance: Ahead of the Game, Boeing Frontiers
Online,
Sept.
2002,
Vol.
1,
Issue
5,
available
at
http://www.boeing.com/news/frontiers/archive/2002/september/i_fofl .html (last visited
Mar. 25, 2005).
83. Commission on Public Trust and Public Enterprise, Report of the Conference
Board, THE CONFERENCE BOARD, INC. Jan. 9, 2003.
84. Intel Corporation, Corporate Governance Guidelines-Intel Corporation Board of

Directors Guidelines on Significant Corporate Governance Issues, available at
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and non-executive chairman on December 1, 2003. Lew Platt, nonexecutive chairman, explained his new position by saying that: "I can
take that load away from [Boeing President and CEO] Harry
[Stonecipher] and focus on all the issues of running the Board, chairing
the Board meetings, setting up the agenda for the meetings and handling
all the governance issues."85 While such a split is not the norm in either
the United States or Japan, in the United Kingdom 95% of the 350
largest companies listed on the London Stock Exchange do split those
positions. 86
In the U.S., the desirability of separating the two positions is
subject to debate. The rationale for keeping one person in the two
positions is not based on the board exercising its monitoring function,
but on ensuring that only one person is in charge of the firm. A
respondent to the 1992 Korn/Ferry survey concluded, "They should be
the same person. If they are not, the Chairman would be a figure-head
or would usurp the role of the CE0."87 This view appears to be the
dominant one in most of the top U.S. corporations. In 1998, CEOs were
also the Chairmen of 93% of the largest companies. Our survey shows
that in 2004, CEOs were Chairmen in 23 (77%) of DJ 30 firms. 88
The corporate governance guidelines of AT&T state: "the
Company's by-laws provide that the Company's Chief Executive
Officer shall also serve as the Company's Chairman of the Board. The
Board believes this policy has served it well in the past and continues to
serve it well at present."89 Until recently, Michael Eisner held both
positions at Disney. However, the 2004 shareholders' meeting at Walt
Disney World was one of the most divisive in history for the firm as
compared to meetings of other firms facing critical problems. Most of
the issues centered on then CEO and Chairman Michael Eisner, who
retained the position of CEO, but not the Chairman's role. Former

http://www.intel.com/intel/finance/corp_gov.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
85. Boeing Frontiers Online, Off and Running-Harry Stonecipher and Lew Platt
Explain Where They See Boeing Going and What They Expect From the Company's People
and
Programs
(March
2004 ),
available
at
http://www.boeing.com/new/frontiers/archive/2004/february/i_qa.html (last visited Mar. 22,
2005).
86. See Associated Press, Rachel Beck, Firms that Split Top Roles See Higher Stock
(Oct.
20,
2004),
available
at
Returns
http://www.macon.com/mld/cctimes/business/9965623.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
87. Korn /Ferry International, Board of Directors, Fourteenth Annual Study (1992).
88. Korn /Ferry International, Board of Directors, Twentieth Annual Study (1998); see
Table 1 for 2004 data at DJ 30 firms.
89. AT&T, Corporate Guidelines, available at http://www.att.com/ir/cg/cgg.html (last
visited Mar. 22, 2005).
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Senator George Mitchell, an Eisner supporter, later was made
Chairman.
Shareholder representatives, who view the board as representing
their interests, are increasingly calling for a separation of the position of
chairman and CE0. 90 Harold Green, former CEO and chairman of ITT
Corp., poses the problem encountered when the CEO is on the board,
whether as Chairman or as an inside member. "If the board of directors
is really there to represent the interest of the stockholders, why is the
chief executive on the board? Doesn't he have a conflict of interest?
He's the professional manager. He cannot represent the shareholders
and impartially sit in judgment of himself." 91 The shareholders appear
to be right in seeking to change the status quo. In terms of corporate
performance two studies found that "companies with separate CEOs and
chairmen consistently outperform those companies that combine the
roles." 92
The 2004 study by Merrill Lynch's chief U.S. market strategist,
Richard Bernstein, showed a 22% return for firms where the roles were
split versus 18% where they were combined. 93

C. Other Governance Characteristics in 3 0 DJ Companies
Although most companies have adopted similar governance
principles, a few have added details in critical areas while others have
included principles not found in most other firms. We examined the
role of the board's audit committee and the expressed importance of
non-shareholder stakeholders. As the authority of a firm's audit
committee has increased due to the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, we looked to see if corporate governance principles reflect the
heightened role for this committee? Similarly, we looked at whether
firms make any express commitments to stakeholders other than
shareholders and if so, which interests are of greater importance?
Both SOX and the NYSE requirements give the audit committee
the sole authority to hire and fire a company's independent auditor and

90. See Edward Iwata, To split, or not to split? USA TODAY, Mar. 17, 2004, at 48
(referring to the California Public Employees' Retirement System (Calpers) and labor
unions as supporting a split); see also TIAA-CREF defends investor interests with updated
statement on corporate governance, TIAA-CREF BALANCE, Spring 2004, at 5 (explaining
that the Policy Statement on Corporate Governance states, "If a board doesn't separate the
positions of chairman and CEO, it should designate an individual who presides over
executive sessions of independent directors.").
91. See Egon Zehnder, International Corporate Issue Monitor, USA, IV, 1 (1989).
92. Beck, supra note 86; MONKS & MINNOW, supra note 21, at 179-80.
93. Beck, supra note 86.
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to approve any significant non-audit relationship with the independent
auditor. 94 The committee also must have the ability to engage
independent counsel and other expert advisors. Additionally, SOX
requires the SEC to propose rules for certifying that one member of the
audit committee is a "financial expert." The NYSE requires company
boards to include nominating, compensation and audit committees, the
same committees required under the revised Japanese Code's
Committee system of governance. A major difference, however, is that
unlike the Japanese law, the NYSE rules require these committees to be
composed solely of independent directors. 95 As the law imposes rather
specific requirements related to the audit committee's role, we found the
governance provisions for this committee to be similar at most firms. 96
The governance principles at Boeing exemplify such provisions. At
Boeing:
Boeing's board of directors already has Audit,
Compensation, Finance, and Governance and Nominating
committees. Only non-employee directors may serve on
these committees. Audit committee members must be
'independent,' pursuant to NYSE rules. All key committees
have written charters that address their purpose, goals and
responsibilities . . . . The audit committee is responsible for
evaluating and selecting outside auditors, subject to
ratification by the full board. [It] also reviews the external
auditor's annual audit plan and report. The board of
directors, or any of its committees, may seek legal or other
expert advice from an independent source outside of the
company. 97
As for stakeholders, several DJ 30 firms have express governance
statements relating to stakeholders. Walt Disney states that it has a
responsibility to the communities where it operates as well as to its
shareholders. It requires management to report on its responsibilities to
the board and notes that the board shall reflect the diversity of the

94. See SOX, Pub. L. No. 107-204, Title IV,§ 301, 116 Stat. 789; Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, Release No. 34-48745, 81 SEC Docket 1586, ~6 (Nov. 4, 2003) [hereinafter
SEC Release No. 34-48745].
95. SEC Release No. 34-48745, supra note 94 (approving requirements stated in the
NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A).
96. SOX, Pub. L. No. 107-204, Title IV,§ 301, 116 Stat. 789.
97. Boeing Company, supra note 82.
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The Corporation has a responsibility to the communities
in which it operates, as well as to its shareholders. To allow
appropriate Board review and input, management shall
prepare and present to the Board an annual review of the
policies, practices and contributions made in fulfillment of
the Corporation's social responsibilities. In addition,
management shall report annually on its diversity efforts and
the results thereof. The Board shall reflect the diversity of the
Corporation's shareholders, employees, customers, guests
and communities. 98
While most corporations note that customers are one of their
important stakeholders, Hewlett Packard's (HP's) corporate objectives
highlight the customer focus more clearly than do other firms. HP
emphasizes loyalty to the customer as the top priority, followed by
making a profit and creating value for the shareholders. HP' s Corporate
Objectives have guided the company in the conduct of its business since
1957, when first written by co-founders Bill Hewlett and Dave Packard.
Microsoft notes that selecting board members requires a consideration
of many factors. Note, however, that it seeks to recommend for its
board a group that can best "represent shareholder interest." Thus,
while its board, like Disney's, should have a diversity of experiences, it
seeks members who will represent the shareholders, not a diverse group
of stakeholders. Microsoft employs a similar approach to HP, noting:
In evaluating the suitability of individual Board
members, the Board . . . evaluates each individual in the
context of the Board as a whole, with the objective of
recommending a group that can best perpetuate the success
of the Company's business and represent shareholder
interests through the exercise of sound judgment, using its
diversity of experience. 99 (emphasis added)
Kodak's commitment to corporate governance and to various
98. Walt Disney Company, Corporate Governance Guidelines, available at
http://www.corporate.disney.go.com/corporate/guidelines.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2005).
99. Microsoft Corporation, Corporate Governance Guidelines, available at
http://www.microsoft.com/msft/govemance/guidelines.mspx (last visited Mar. 14, 2005).
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stakeholders is reflected in the 2003 publication of its "Corporate
Responsibility Principles." 100 The Principles place importance on high
ethical standards, obeying the laws, conducting business activities in an
environmentally responsible manner, respecting the privacy rights of its
employees, customers and suppliers, and maintaining a philanthropic
program. Kodak also brought corporate governance issues into its
management structure by appointing, in July 2003, the company's first
chief governance officer. The chief governance officer is responsible for
leading the company's efforts to comply with government and New
York Stock Exchange mandates and to identify and adopt best practices
in the corporate governance arena. The person is to perform ongoing
assessments of the governance practices and structure of the company's
board of directors, and will identify opportunities for improvement. It
will be interesting to see if many other companies follow Kodak's
example of assigning a high-level person to specifically look at
governance issues. Could the CGO follow the CIO as new executive
positions in major firms?
IV. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPANESE CORPORATIONS

As of July 1, 2004 approximately 90 companies in Japan have
adopted the "Company with Committees" system. 101 After the 2003
shareholders meeting, the first held under the revised Commercial Code,
some forty-five companies changed their corporate governance structure
by adopting the "Company with Committees" system. While 45 more
companies subsequently adopted the new system, most Japanese
companies express misgivings about adopting U.S.-style corporate
governance and they have not changed their corporate governance
structure.
A. Summary of Governance Structure

According to a survey conducted by the Japanese Investor
Relations and Investor Support, Inc., the average size of a board at
1,616 firms of the Tokyo Stock Exchange is 11.7. The average at the
NIKKEi 225 firms is a little larger, 15.5 as of the end of June 2003.
Both figures are comparable to the 12.5 average we found, as of June
2004, for the DJ 30 firms. As for outside directors, the Tokyo Stock
Exchange firms average 1.0 outside directors while the NIKKEi 225

100. Eastman Kodak Company, Corporate Responsibility Principles, available at
http://www.kodak.com/US/en/corp/principles/principles.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2005).
101. See Nihon Keizai Shinbun, NIKKEL, Aug. 22, 2004, at I.
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average 0.8 outside directors. 102 Even though firms adopting the new
governance system added outside directors to their boards, inside
directors still dominate at those firms as well as at all other Japanese
firms. In about 75% of the companies that adopted the "Company with
Committees" governance system, the .number of inside directors
exceeds the number of outside directors. 103

TABLE 3: Major Japanese Firms Where Outside Directors
Dominate

APAN TELECOM CO., LTD.
-PHONE Co., Ltd. #2
OYA CORPORATION
esona Holdin s, Inc.
OilMA CORPORATION
itachi Kokusai Electric Inc.

* The 2004 data is shown with ( ) being the number as of July 1, 2004,
and is based on the firms' home pages.
** The 2003 data is based on the list of Companies that moved to
"Company with Committees" system, No. 1669 Shozi Homu, (July 2003).
# 1 Vodafone Holdings since December 2003.
#2VodafoneK.K. since October 2003.
As noted in Table 3, firms where outside directors are dominant
include Hoya Corp., Japan Telecom holdings, Seiyu, Ltd., and Resona

102. See Research by Japan Investor Relations and Investor Support, Inc., available at
http://www.rieti.go.jp/users/cgi/jp/columns/colurnns_O 12.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2005).
103. See The list of Companies that moved to the "Company with Committees" system,
No. 1669 Shozi Homu 33 (July 2003), at 33 [hereinafter List of Companies that Moved].
Fifty-five companies, including 14 Nomura Securities group companies, adopted the
"Company with Committees" system. Ten of them have boards with a majority of outside
directors. Id.
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Bank. 104 In most cases, the outside directors include a large number of
lawyers and academics. Even where there are outside directors, they
may not be considered independent. At the June 2004 Hitachi group
shareholders meeting, the independence of some outside directors was
strictly questioned. Institutional Shareholder Service strongly argued
that some of the outside directors would be unable to monitor the
firm. 105 Some companies have reacted to the concern with an outside
director' s independence. For example, Teijin, although it did not adopt
the "Company with Committees" system, requires independence for its
outside directors. Independence is defined as not having a material
relationship that, in the opinion of the board, would interfere with the
exercise of independent judgment. 106

B. Why have some Corporations adopted the "Company with
Committees" governance system?
The reasons why companies have adopted the new system can be
classified into four categories. The first category includes companies
that are developing their business operations and raising funds globally.
Toshiba, Sony, HOYA and Mitsubishi Electric exemplify these
companies. The second category includes Japanese firms that are the
affiliates of firms based outside Japan. They include Seiyu Ltd., the
affiliate of Wal-Mart in the U.S., and Japan Telecom, the affiliate of
Vodafone in the U .K. The third category includes companies trying to
enhance a group-wide framework to be better able to respond to
changing conditions. These firms now seek to operate by establishing a
consolidated system rather than through numerous semi-independent
units. The Hitachi group and the Nomura group are in this category.
Finally, some firms, such as Resona Bank, were forced to adopt the new
system in order to receive needed public funding.
The CEOs of the firms that have adopted the new "Company with
Committees" system seem pleased with the change, particularly as it
relates to outside directors. According to a survey of CEOs from 41
companies that adopted the new system in the first year, almost all
(84%) felt that the presence of outside directors enhanced and

104. See Table 3 infra (provides a complete list of the firms having a majority of
outside directors).
105. See U.S. Style Governance at the Second Year, NIKKEi WEEKLY, July 6, 2004, at
15.
106. See Independence, NIKKEi WEEKLY, June 6, 2004 at 3. (According to their
definition, three of the ten directors at Teijin would be regarded as independent).
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revitalized their boards. 107 A clear majority (63 % ) also reported quicker
decision-making. Two-thirds of the CEOs report they would also like to
increase the opportunity to discuss items of importance with the outside
directors. 108 Specific examples of firms in each category that have
changed their methods of corporate governance are noted in the
following section.
C. Corporations that have changed to the "Company with Committees"
System

1. Changes made due to the global nature of the firm
Sony Corporation changed its governance system because it has
global business operations and raises capital through global markets. 109
Sony has a long history of continually modifying its management and
organization structures to better adapt to changing business
environments. When it was listed on the NYSE in 1970, it appointed
two outside directors. 110 In 1991, Sony appointed a non-Japanese as an
outside director and in 1997 it separated the oversight and business
operation functions within the company by reorganizing the Board and
establishing Japan's first corporate executive officer ("Shikko-yakuin")
system. 111 In 2000, the position of chairman of the board was created
and in 2002, it created an advisory board to enhance board of directors'
discussions with expert outside advice. That same year the distinction in
roles between directors and corporate executive officers was further
clarified by abolishing rank-titles for directors. 112
Sony not only adopted the "Company with Committees" system in
June 2003, it also introduced internal standards for a separation between
the chairman of the board of directors and representative corporate
executive officers. In addition, it imposed qualifications for board
candidates so as to eliminate conflicts of interest and changed the
composition of the board's nominating and compensation committees
so that a majority of members on each committee are to be outside
directors. After its June 2003 shareholders meeting, Sony announced

l 07. See Survey, NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN (NIKKEi), June 26, 2004, at 6.
108. Id.
109. SONY CORPORATION, Reforming the Sony Group Management Structure to
Strengthen
Corporate
Governance,
available
at
http://www.sony.net/Sonylnfo/News/Press/200301/03-004E/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2005).
llO. Id.
ll l. Id.
112. SONY, supra note 109.
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that the total number of directors would be 16 (an increase from 11 in
2002), with 8 being outside directors. Three representative corporate
executive officers and five corporate executive officers also served as
directors. Despite the changes made by Sony, some critics feel it has not
gone far enough. Nikkei Business surveyed asset fund managers from
132 management companies and 67 insurance companies regarding the
board ranking of both good and bad firms. Based on responses from 104
managers, Sony ranked as both the sixth best company and the sixth
worst. 113 The comments said that Sony's governance was bad because it
neither put importance on shareholders' value nor provided sufficient
disclosure of executive compensation. A fund manager criticized what it
called "Sony shock" when a top executive suddenly lowered the
earnings estimate shortly after providing a very optimistic forecast.
Similarly, although there was a motion at the general meeting of
shareholders to disclose executive compensation, it was defeated. 114
According to Sony's 2004 annual report, "at the general meeting of
shareholders held on June 22, 2004, shareholders elected 16 directors,
including 8 outside directors. At the subsequent board of directors
meeting, members of three statutory committees and 15 corporate
executive officers, including the two representative corporate executive
officers, were determined." 115
2. Changes made due to firm being a part of non-Japanese based group

In order to enhance the group strategy as an affiliate of Vodafone
of the U.K., Japan Telecom (JT) moved to the "Company with
Committees" system. As of June 2004, it had 10 directors with 7 from
outside the firm. Seiyu also now uses the "Company with Committees"
system to enhance its partnership with Wal-Mart. Sei~'s Board had 12
directors, 7 of whom are from outside in June 2003. 1 6 Of the firm's 11
executive officers, 5 were also directors. 117 The size of board was
reduced to eleven in June 2004.

113. See Board Ranking in 2003, NIKKEi WEEKLY BUSINESS, Jan. 12, 2003, at 39.
114. See id. at 40.
115. SONY CORPORATION, ANNUAL REPORT 2004, CORPORA TE GOVERNANCE, available at
http://www.sony.net/SonyInfo/IR/financial/ar/2004/qfhh7cOOOOOOeedhatt/Corporate_Govemance. pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2005).
116. See The List of Companies that Moved, supra note 103, at 39.
117. Id.
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3. Changes made to have a group-wide system for organizational
strategy
Hitachi Limited and the Hitachi Group of companies exemplify
firms that have adopted the new governance system so that it and its
affiliates can respond more quickly to needed business reorganizations
or strategic opportunities. On January 30, 2003, Hitachi Ltd. announced
that the Hitachi Group would radically alter its corporate governance
structure by adopting a new structure.1 18 The key goals for the new
system include:
( 1) Dramatic improvement in speed of management;
(2) More transparent management practices;
(3) To improve the group companies' management strategy; and
(4) To enhance global management 119
To achieve these goals, Hitachi has made changes in its corporate
governance. For example four non-affiliated individuals, with expertise
in corporate manar:ement, administration and legal affairs, will become
Hitachi directors. 20 The third goal, improvement of the group's
management strategy, brings certain group companies' directors to
Hitachi's Board for the first time and also moves several Hitachi
directors and executive officers to the boards of group companies as
outside directors. 121 This will greatly strengthen the oversight system for
the entire group. In the June 2003 shareholders meeting of Hitachi Ltd.,
four outside directors were appointed while 33 board members from the
parent, Hitachi Ltd., were elected to the boards of subsidiaries. 122

4. Changes made due to government requirement and receipt ofpublic
funds
Resona Bank was essentially required or pressured into making a
change in their corporate governance system. Resona was established in
2002 as Japan's fifth largest bank by the merger of Osaka-based Daiwa
Bank Holdings Inc. and Tokyo-based Asahi Bank. Several analysts
described it as a marriage of weaklings.1 23 As Resona's external
118. News Release, Hitachi, Ltd., Reinforcing Corporate Governance, available at
http://www.hitachi.com/New/cnews/E/2003/0130a/index.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2005).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. CLARINET, Japanese Bank Resona to Cut 4,000 Jobs, Oct. 29, 2003, available at

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol32/iss2/2

34

Toda and McCarty: Corporate Governance Changes In The Two Largest Economies: What's

2005]

Corporate Governance in the U.S. and Japan

223

auditors decided to apply stricter assessment of the value of deferred tax
assets, the bank's capital ratio declined to around 2%, well below the
required 4% level for domestic banks. 124 At the end of March 2003, the
Prime Minister and the Financial System Management Council decided
to inject 2.3 trillion yen from public funds to eliminate concerns about
the bank's future among depositors, customers, and investors.125 At the
same time, the bank decided to replace old management, inviting
directors from outside the group and adopting a "Company with
Committees" system to strengthen corporate governance and make its
management more transparent. 126 In June 2004, Resona reduced the size
of the board from eleven to nine with three directors from inside and six
from outside. 127 Before the 2003 and 2004 changes, all 11 directors
were from inside.
D. Corporations that created their own system of corporate governance

Two well-known Japanese global firms, Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co. Ltd. (MEI) and Toyota Motor Co. (TMC), have each
established a corporate governance system that blends features of
traditional Japanese governance with U.S.-style governance. Their
boards mainly focus on the monitoring function and deciding corporate
strategy, while the decision making regarding daily operations is settled
by executive officers at operational fronts. These firms are not seeking
to completely isolate supervisory functions from execution functions,
but instead want both operational and supervisory representatives on the
board.
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. implemented a new group
management system and established its new corporate governance
system on April 23, 2003. Each of MEI' s business domain companies
will have autonomous management while an Executive Officer System
will be used to integrate the comprehensive strengths of all group
companies. 128 The board of directors will elect executive officers, who

http://quickstart.clari.net/qs_se/webnews/wed/an?Qjpan-banking-resona.RT-y_DOU .html
(last visited Mar. 24, 2005).
124. Resona Bank, Establishing New Corporate Governance Structure, available at
http://quickstart.clari.net/qs_se/webnews/wed/an/Qjapan-banking-resona.RT-y_DOU .html
(Mar. 24, 2005).
125. Id.
126. Resona Bank, supra note 124.
127. Panasonic News, Matsushita New Group Management System, available at
http://www.matsushita.co.jp/corp/news/official.data/data.dir/en0304233/en030423-3.html
(Mar. 24, 2005).
128. Panasonic News, supra note 127.
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will each serve in that capacity for one year. 129 executive officers will
be equal, in terms of rank and status, to members of the board of
directors. 130
The MEI Board will focus mainly on deciding corporate
strategies and monitoring and supervising business domain
companies with the responsibilities for execution of business
held by Executive Officers. MEI will not change its policy of
having management personnel, who are well versed in dayto-day operations, participate in Board of Directors meetings.
To strengthen the internal auditing function, full-time Senior
Auditors will be placed at MEI internal division companies
and a group auditors meeting will promote collaboration with
subsidiaries' corporate auditors. 131
As of June 2004, the number of directors decreased from 27 to
19. 132 Out of 19, six internal directors will have only monitoring
responsibilities while the other 11 internal directors will have both
monitoring and operational responsibilities. 133 There are two outside
directors. "Through these reforms, the board of directors maintains
balance in terms of the backgrounds of its members, while reducing the
total number of board members. The terms of office for board members
has also been shortened to one year to clarify their responsibilities and
allow for a more dynamic organization" 134
TMC's governance system is meant to make the most of its
traditional strengths. These include placing at its management core
people capable of understanding and putting into practice TMC's
corporate principles and of practicing hands-on decision-making
(gene hi genbutsu-going to an issue's source to understand the actual
situation, build consensus and expediently achieve one's goal). 135 At the
same time the company partially adopted an U.S.-style system and

129. Panasonic News, supra note 127.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Matsushita Electric, Annual Report 2004, 34,
available at http://irsite.panasonic.com/annual/2004/html/34/index.html (Mar. 24, 2005).
135. Toyota Motor Corporation, Toyota to Introduce New Management System,
Streamlined Board, New Managing Officers Aimed at Faster Decision-making (Mar. 28,
2003), available at
http://www.toyota.co.jp/jp/news/03/Mar/nt03_0310.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2005).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol32/iss2/2

36

Toda and McCarty: Corporate Governance Changes In The Two Largest Economies: What's

2005]

Corporate Governance in the U.S. and Japan

225

sought to strengthen corporate auditing efforts by increasing the number
of outside statutory auditors. 136 The statutory auditors will be increased
to seven, four of whom are from outside the company. 137
The new management system includes several notable changes.
Non-board managing officers "will number about 30-40 persons, each
in charge of daily operations in specific fields/divisions, and include
non-Japanese and younger appointees, as well as executives resident at
TMC's overseas affiliates, whose numbers will be increased. Each will
be appointed for a one-year term." 138 The new board consists of 27
members, down from 58. All are at the senior managing director rank
or higher. The number of non-board managing officers is 44 as of July
1, 2004. This system is different from the typical "Company with
Committees" system as Toyota has no outside director on the board and
the system is heavily dependent upon the role of senior managing
directors responsible for both oversight and operations. "Pursuant to
home country practices exemptions granted by the New York Stock
Exchange (the 'NYSE'), Toyota Motor Corporation ... is permitted to
follow certain corporate governance practices complying with Japanese
laws, regulations and stock exchange rules in lieu of NYSE' s listing
standards." 139
E. Corporations that have not changed their corporate governance
Despite the changes in the Commercial Code, most companies in
Japan kept their current corporate governance structure. There is a great
deal of opposition to the introduction of outside directors. Criticism to
this system amounts to the question: "What do those from the outside
know about our company?" The main concern is that such board
members would not be capable of properly judging the company's
business practices to make an appropriate decision. 140 Another concern
is the availability of qualified candidates. According to a Ministry of
Finance report, "in Japan there are not many appropriate outside
directors and that is one of the big reasons why Japanese companies are
reluctant to adopt outside directors." 141 Table 4 depicts the reasons why
136. Toyota Motor Corporation, supra note 135.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Toyota Motor Corporation, Annual Report 2004, 19, available at
http://www.toyota.co.jp/en/ir/reports/annual_reports/04/governance/2.html (last visited Mar.
24, 2005).
140. See Iwao Nakatani et. al., Corporate Governance Reform ofJapanese Companies,
TOYO KEIZA SHINPOSHA, Feb. 2003, at 268.
141. Japanese Ministry of Finance Policy Research Institute, Progress in Corporate
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Japanese firms have not adopted the "Company with Committees"
system of governance. The first three responses indicate a general
satisfaction with the status quo and a reluctance to change.
TABLE 4: Reasons Why Japanese Firms Have Not Adopted A
"Company with Committees" Governance System
Improvement of efficiency and soundness is
possible through current system

44.0%

torrent statutory auditor's system functions
M'ell

42.8%

torrent system is well-suited to Japanese society
and culture

31.5%

Improvement of transparency is possible
through current system

24.1%

It is too difficult to have appropriate outside

13.4%

directors

*

The data is based on the responses of a 5/8/03 survey sent to 995 companies
by the Japanese Association of Corporate Auditors. See Report from Ministry of
Finance Policy Research Institute, Progress in Corporate Governance Reforms
and Revitalization ofJapanese Companies (June 2003).

One of the companies that made no changes is Canon Inc. Its
President, Mr. Mitarai, strongly defends the current corporate
governance structure. He argues that
the existing corporate system under superv1s1on of its
auditors works just fine for Canon. At many U.S. companies
what outside directors actually do is just listen to corporate
executives' explanations about companies, rather than
performing their supposed role of supervising management.
This is because they have little knowledge about day-to-day
operations of companies due to part-time status. 142

Governance Reforms and Revitalization ofJapanese Companies, at 36.
142. U.S.-Style Corporate Governance?, NIKKEIWEEKLY, June 30, 2003, at 9.
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At Canon, there are 28 directors and all are internal. Mr. Mitarai
explained that to become a director is a dream of many employees. 143
According to a May 2003 survey of 1, 194 companies by the
Japanese Association of Corporate Auditors, as of that date only 1.3%
of companies actually shifted to the "Company with Committees"
system and the number considering a change was only 1.2%. 144Another
survey, published in the weekly Toyo Keizai, found approximately
1,500 outside directors in publicly listed companies. Of those 1,500 at
least 1,000 are either from a firm's large shareholders, main banks, or
from companies with which it has a material business relationship. 145
Thus, even though they are outside directors, they are not independent.
These surveys show that most of Japanese companies have so far made
no change, despite the Commercial Code revision. Still, the law is
having some effect even at those companies; some of them are
establishing their own committees for nomination and compensation.
Professor Nobuo Nakamura of Waseda University notes, "These new
methods will go far in helping conventionally managed corporations
improve the effectiveness of corporate governance." 146 It may be said
that Japanese companies are trying to establish their own competitive
system, although the progress looks slow.·
CONCLUSION

Corporate governance structures in both U.S. and Japanese firms
have changed after the Sarbanes-Oxley and Commercial Code
legislative reforms, even though, to date, the reforms are taking place in
only a small number of Japanese firms. The starkest difference in
governance in each country's firms is in the composition of the boards.
Almost all Japanese directors are from inside the firm while almost all
U.S. directors are from outside the firm. In our view, the choice
between inside and outside board members relates to differing views in
each country as to the board's primary function-be it establishing

143. See Board Ranking in 2003, supra note 113, at 41.
144. See The Report of Research, How Companies Moved After the Revision of
Commercial Code in 2003, JAPANESE ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE AUDITORS, May 8, 2003
(According to the survey, 1.3% of 1,194 companies had actually shifted, 1.2% were
considering a shift to the "Company with Committees" system, .83.5% companies had no
plan to shift and 14.7% companies, which was 50.8% in the May 2002 survey, had not

decided yet).
145. See Do Outside Directors Function Well?, Special Report, WEEKLY TOYO KEIZAI
(Oct. 18, 2003), at 110.
146. See Nakamura, supra note 52, at 10.
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management policies and strategy or monitoring the management.
Boards always have, and always will, simultaneously serve both the
managerial and monitoring functions. As SEC Commissioner Cynthia
Glassman has noted, "we should recognize that there is an undeniable
tension between the dual roles of directors as partners with management
in running the company on the one hand, and as judges of
management's performance on the other." 147
While the composition of the board differs dramatically in Japan
and the United States, the size of the boards are now smaller and
comparable, from 10-15, in each country's firms. 148 As for the critical
issue of the independence of board members, most firms in both
countries did not measure up. While directors in U.S. firms are usually
outsiders, due to their close relationship with the CEO, many of those
directors cannot be considered independent. Nevertheless, due to the
recent NASDAQ and NYSE rules there is greater use of independent
directors in U.S. firms than in Japanese firms. 149 Although Japanese
critics rightly note that inside directors generally perform well the
strategic oversight and mediating functions, at critical times the role and
responsibility of outside independent directors becomes crucial. For
example, Professor Bernard S. Black of Stanford Law School discusses
the duty of special care of outside directors when a firm is a takeover
target. 150 On the other hand, during the recent financial scandals at a
number of U.S. firms, many "outside directors" lacked the
independence to challenge a CEO' s financial misstatements or selfinterest actions. 151 Outside independent directors also need to be
provided with necessary, full, timely, and accurate information while
employees and managers need access to board members. Reporting of
concerns to independent directors or an audit committee, as described in
GE's guidelines, 152 is important to establish an enhanced risk
management system.
As Japanese firms move towards different governing systems, their
need for board members with independent views will take different
forms. As firms that do not move to a "Company with Committees"
147. See Glassman, supra note 22.
148. See Table 1 supra; see also Research by Japan Investor Relations, supra note 102.
149. See discussion supra note 23.
150. See Bernard S. Black, The Core Fiduciary Duties of Outside Directors, ASIA Bus.
L. REV., July 2001, at 3.
151. See U.S.-Style Corporate Governance?, supra note 142.
152. General Electric, Our Commitment: GE Governance Principles, available at
http:www .ge.com/en/spotlight/commitment/governance/governance_princples.htm
(last
visited Mar. 24, 2005).
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system continue to use the statutory auditor to monitor managers'
decisions, the independence of most of the statutory auditors, rather
than the independence of a majority of all board members, is critical.
For firms that do switch to a "Company with Committees" system, thus
giving up the outside statutory auditor and potentially losing any
external perspective, it is important that they develop a structure which
ensures that effective monitoring will still be performed. Although the
law requires a majority of each committee consist of outside directors, it
does not require outside directors to constitute a majority of the board.
Several problems with the Commercial Code need to be addressed.
The Code defines who are outside directors, but does not require them
to be independent. 153 Thus, a board could consist mostly of outside
directors who have material relationships with the firm.
We
recommend the law require firms that move to the "Company with
Committees" system include a majority of independent directors on the
board. Insiders alone cannot provide the independence and external
perspective needed in many such decisions. Another problem is that the
Code still allows an outside director to serve on more than one
committee. Such a director could be a member of three committees and
also have a material relationship or be a good friend of the CEO.
Similarly, an outside statutory auditor may have a material relationship,
such as being from a firm's main bank or from a company that has a
significant business relationship with a firm. 154 In both cases,
independence should be required for those positions.
Boards also need to determine whether to separate the position
from the chairman's position and how to set an adequate, but not
exorbitant, level of compensation. Although there is controversy, we
conclude that such a separation helps make clear the distinction between
the monitoring function, which the chairman is responsible for, and the
execution function, which the CEO performs. When the CEO is also
chairman of the board, the board is less likely to challenge any of the
CEO's recommendations. As to compensation, in both the U.S. and
Japan there seems to be widespread agreement that some CEOs,
particularly in the U.S., are paid too much. In 2001, the average CEO
compensation in the U.S. was over 411 times the compensation for the
average line workers in 2001. By comparison it was 43 times in 1980. 155
Kazuo lnamori, founder and Chairman emeritus of Kyocera argues,

153. See Maeda et al., supra note 66, at 56.
154. See id. at 271.
155. See USA TODAY, Apr. 21, 2003, at 4.
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Of course, a leader should be given a certain amount of
power and compensation. However, directors, officers,
general managers, department heads and tens of thousands of
other employees are also working together and producing
profit for corporation through their joint efforts. Corporate
profit is the fruit of such joint efforts and should be shared
with all the people. 156
Finally, other stakeholders are becoming more important to a
corporation and their interests also must receive attention. As noted in
one corporation's statement about corporate objectives, corporate laws
in the U.S. give directors and officers the flexibility to balance
shareholders' interest against other stakeholders. 157 Moreover, both in
Japan and the United States, environmental and social responsibility are
becoming critical issues for corporations and their customers, suppliers,
employees and investors. The latest report on corporate governance
reform from Japan's Ministry of Finance's Policy Research Institute
notes that although
it is generally considered that corporate governance reforms
and management that places priority on employees are in an
antagonistic relationship, this is not necessarily the case. The
greater the extent to which employees are involved in
management at companies under the strong monitoring
pressure of capital markets, the more active those firms were
toward corporate governance reforms. 158
The Institute' s report also argues, "what was especially interesting here
was that firms which maintained long-term employment, while
attempting to introduce a merit-based wage system, actively pursued
reforms and enjoyed high performance. This combination of long-term
employment, merit based wages and active information disclosure can
be seen as a model for rejuvenating Japanese companies." 159 For both
employees and shareholders some blending of Japanese and U.S.

156. See USA TODAY, supra note 156.
157. See
Hewlett-Packard
Company,
Corporate
Objectives,
at
http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/abouthp/corpobj.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2005).
158. Hideaki Miyajima, Progress in Corporate Governance Reforms and the
Revitalization of Japanese Companies, at http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/columns/a01_0097.html
(last visited Mar. 24, 2005).
159. See Miyajima, supra note 158.
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corporate governance systems appears attractive.
An earlier article on the role of boards concluded that "the proper
balance between the paradigms of the [b ]oard as manager versus
monitor will differ depending on a number of company-specific
characteristics." 160 We would add that cultural differences also affect
the balance. By utilizing their unique cultural and historic strengths,
Japanese companies have and will continue to establish their own
competitive corporate governance structures, as is true at both
Matsushita and Toyota. Investors in both the U.S. and Japan are paying
close attention to corporate governance that includes a board performing
an effective oversight function. As the legal changes in the U.S. were
much more encompassing than those enacted into law in Japan, it is in
Japan where further legislation, related to the independence of board
members, is required. Japanese firms and investors should demand that
the government quickly implement such changes. As to changes by the
corporations, although the method of implementation will differ,
directors and officers in both U.S. and Japanese companies should adopt
and implement an effective and competitive corporate governance
system that suits their company's ability to grow and responds to the
needs of stakeholders.

160. See Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19
284-86.
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